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This chapter examines the development of WAG systems since the fall of Communism in 1989. 
Drawing on Robertson’s (1994; 1995) glocalisation theory, we examine how six case countries 
– Australia, Brazil, Italy, Romania, Russia, and The Netherlands – developed in relation to the 
global context of state-managed (Communist) WAG system thinking and local conditions and 
events. Our results show that Romanian and Russian WAG was significantly interrupted by the 
fall of Communism and today still need to recover to re-invent and stabilise their systems. 
Australia was earliest and has most prominently invested in elite WAG through the national 
government’s implementation of a state-managed elite sport. Their system and performance 
success has, however, experienced challenges that have caused a number of changes. Brazil, 
Italy, and The Netherlands have not benefitted from extensive national elite sport systems, and 
their governing bodies have less consistently invested in WAG. Italy and The Netherlands have, 
however, adopted creative measures to develop WAG, particularly through popularisation 
activities. Italy stands out as an example of most effective local sustainable development, having 
achieved performance success, acquired funds for their elite operations, and importantly, not 
suffered allegations of abuse. In combination, the decline of Communist WAG and growth of 
Western successes has de-centred the East and diversified this sport’s competitive landscape. 
 
Introduction 
From 1952 until the fall of Communism in 1989, the most successful women’s artistic gymnasts 
emerged from Communist sport regimes. Soviet gymnast Olga Korbut, Romanian Nadia 
Comaneci, and East German Maxi Gnauck were key such champions. The regimes, driven by 
the aim to demonstrate the superiority of the Communist way of life, were state-governed and 
–funded. They entailed modern training facilities, full-time coaching and support personnel, 
tertiary-level sport and coaching education, sport science research, network of sports (boarding) 
schools, financial assistance for athletes and generous rewards for competitive success (also for 
coaches), and a nation-wide talent identification procedure (Green & Oakley, 2001; Houlihan, 
1994; Riordan, 1993; 2007). In addition to regime character, an additional feature that typified 
the Communist WAG system was what Kerr and colleagues (2017) have termed ‘pixie-style 
model of WAG’. This model emerged at the end of the 1960s, and as represented by gymnasts 
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such as Korbut and Comaneci, prescribed gymnasts’ age as young, bodies as small in length, 
free of fat, and sexually undeveloped, and behaviour as obedient, darling-like and cute (Barker-
Ruchti, 2009; Kerr, 2006). The training of ‘pixie gymnasts’ constituted early identification and 
specialisation, long hours with numerous repetitions to learn skills, and coach authority. These 
characteristics, and particularly the increasing risks for gymnasts that became associated with 
the increasing acrobatic form of WAG, concerned media and WAG stakeholders, especially 
during the 1970s (Barker-Ruchti, 2011). However, in the context of Cold War politics, the 
competitive success of the Communist gymnasts afforded the WAG system international role 
model status (Petracovschi, & Terret, 2013; Riordan, 1995) and convinced the international 
community that they needed to develop their WAG systems along pixie WAG policies, systems, 
and practices (Cervin, 2017). This copying was not limited to WAG, but represented what a 
number of scholars have called a ‘global sporting flow from East to West’ (Green & Collins, 
2008; Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green & Oakley, 2001). 
The fall of Communism in 1989 significantly impacted the international sport landscape 
(Riordan, 1995). While China was not affected, the East German system dissolved1 and the 
other European Communist countries were faced with a choice of ‘how sharply they should 
break with the past and adopt a pattern of sport based on market relations’ (Riordan, 1995, p. 
24). To date, few researchers have examined the consequences of the fall on former Communist 
countries’ national elite sport systems. Two exceptions are Girginov and Sandanski’s (2008) 
study on Bulgaria, and Petracovschi and Terrets’ study on Romania, both of which describe the 
difficulties the countries experienced with regard to professionalization and private financing 
of elite sport. The Bulgarian case study identified three phases that affected the elite sport 
system between 1989 and 2000: The shrinking of the sport system, especially the number of 
sport organisations and the athlete population; the insulation of national sport organisations, 
mainly because they lacked state support; and the expansion of elite sport through development 
and innovation strategies that individual sport organisations implemented.  
With relevance to how WAG in both former Communist and non-Communist countries 
has developed since 1989, what has changed is that a large proportion of coaches from former 
Communist countries have found employment around the globe. While statistics of the exodus 
are not available, qualitative investigations demonstrate what the transfer of Communist WAG 
expertise has meant for both the emigrating coaches and the receiving clubs and gymnasts (Kerr 
 
1 We acknowledge that the unification of East and West Germany integrated some Communist sport system 
characteristics (Volkwein & Haag, 1994). 
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& Obel, 2018). Further, what we can observe is that the competition landscape has changed 
since 1989. While Romanian and Russian gymnasts continue to perform well at international 
events, their dominance is not as strong. Today, gymnasts from around the globe successfully 
participate in highest international competitions.  
In this chapter, the purpose is to examine the development of WAG systems since 1989 
through the inclusion of six case countries - Australia, Brazil, Italy, Romania, Russia, and The 
Netherlands. Specifically, we pose the following questions: How did the fall of Communism 
reduce Romania’s and Russia’s WAG dominance? How did the Australian, Brazilian, Italian, 
and Dutch WAG governing bodies develop their systems to gain competitive ground? And 
lastly, what have the two former Communist countries done to reinvent their WAG systems 
since 1989? To answer these questions, we adopt glocalisation thinking (Robertson, 1994; 
1995). Our theoretical starting point is Giulianotti and Robertson’s (2012) argument that sports 
governing bodies and stakeholders do not simply follow global trends, but must develop 
innovative methods to remain competitive (for similar arguments, see Collins & Bailey, 2013; 
Green & Oakley, 2001; Maguire, 1994). Specific to WAG, we recognise the global influence 
the Communist WAG system continues to have, but assume that all national governing bodies 
develop and implement local measures to produce competitive success. 
Glocalisation theory and WAG  
Scholars critical of the concept of globalisation developed glocalisation theory (e.g., Ferguson, 
1992; Scholte, 2008). Robertson (1994; 1995), a key proponent of glocalisation, critiqued 
globalisation theory for being ambiguous, elusive and even redundant because he felt the 
conception neglected how local conditions, events, processes, and activities diversify societies. 
Robertson (1995, p. 25) even went as far as to write that globalisation mystifies cultural 
homogenisation, and the idea that ‘bigger is better’, obliterating ‘locality – even history’. In 
arguing that localising forces and heterogenisation are features of life, Robertson (1995) moved 
beyond global homogenisation and universalization to blend the terms ‘global’ and ‘local’ with 
‘glocal’.  
Robertson (1992) understands glocalisation as a social process (rather than an abstract 
category), through which communities develop according to global and local trends and 
standards. In his views, such ‘glocalisation projects’ represent the continuous ‘features of 
contemporary globalization’, capturing how individuals, social groups, and communities 
interpret, shape, and decontextualize global phenomena to suit their everyday activities 
(Robertson, 1994; 1995). Such glocal ‘action-reaction’ processes generate ‘homegrown’ 
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activities (Collins & Bailey, 2013), which have particular relevance for sport since, on the one 
hand, international governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and 
international and continental (sport-specific) governing bodies (e.g., International Gymnastics 
Federation; European Gymnastics Federation) significantly shape domestic policies and 
systems (Houlihan, 2009). On the other hand, research points to how local historical, socio-
cultural and political conditions and events, government mentalities, financial conditions, and 
developmental activities influence local practices (Barker-Ruchti et al., 2017; Giulianotti & 
Robertson, 2012).  
With regard to sport, Giulianotti and Robertson have led glocalisation research. This 
work has examined the development of football game identity and the emergence of 
transnational sport corporations (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2004); fanship (Giulianotti & 
Robertson, 2006) migration of football players (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007); and the 
development of Asian sport (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2006, 2012). With regard to gymnastics, 
researchers have recently adopted the glocalisation perspective to examine the sportization of 
parkour2 in New Zealand and Italy (Puddle, Wheaton, & Thorpe, 2018; Sterchele & Ferrero 
Camoletto, 2017), and Chinese sport and gymnastics governing bodies’ reactions to gymnastics 
developments since the 1950s (Zheng, Tan, & Bairner, 2017). This latter research demonstrates 
how Chinese gymnastics predominantly developed in relation to USSR gymnastics. This 
adoption process was at times passive, that is, was globalising as Soviet influence extensively 
shaped Chinese policy domains. At other times, the Chinese responses were more participative, 
which involved the Chinese gymnastics governing body actively influencing the International 
Gymnastics Federation. A third response, which took place during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), was conflicting, as Mao Zedong’s governance halted all gymnastics 
activities. Zheng and colleagues’ study is exemplary in demonstrating how local conditions and 
events (e.g., Chinese Cultural Revolution), governmental processes (e.g., international 
influence through representation at the International Federation of Gymnastics - FIG), and 
developmental activities (e.g., training camps in the USSR) shaped local gymnastics operations, 
and importantly, affected gymnasts’ competitive success during different phases of Chinese 
gymnastics developments.  
 
2 While parkour is not a traditional gymnastics discipline, international and national gymnastics governing bodies 




Against this glocalisation background, the six case country authors included in this 
chapter collected materials to chronologise the conditions, events, processes, and activities that 
influenced their countries’ WAG systems. The materials included information on governance 
and structure of WAG; financing; number and demographics of the elite gymnast population; 
competitive success at major events; coach population; and other relevant information as to the 
state of WAG prior and since the fall of Communism. The information was collated through 
the authors’ expert knowledge of WAG in the case countries; publicly available documents; 
informal interviews with relevant WAG stakeholders; and scientific and media texts. To collate 
the materials, the first author created Table 1, which presents developments the case country 
authors reported to have shaped WAG prior to and since the fall of Communism. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Based on the tabled information, we present below the six countries’ developments prior to 
1989 and since the fall of Communism. In the first section, we cluster the Communist and non-
Communist countries to sketch their distinctive situations. In the second section, our aim is to 
highlight the local events and conditions that have shaped WAG developments since 1989. We 
begin with Australia as a state-managed system; move to Romania and Russia as former state-
managed systems; and then Brazil and The Netherlands as systems receiving limited and 
temporary state support. Lastly, we present Italy, as this country’s development were most 
heterogeneous.  
WAG prior to 1989 
Prior to 1989, the WAG systems in the two Communist and four non-Communist countries 
differed. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the Romanian and Soviet systems 
constituted state-governed and -funded regimes (Riordan, 2003). In Australia, Brazil, Italy, and 
the Netherlands, (elite) sport did not have regime character. Rather, individual institutions (e.g. 
clubs), mostly through volunteers, offered sport activities and in some cases elite sport training. 
Yet, as the global sporting arms race gained importance (Grix & Carmichael, 2012; Houlihan 
& Zheng, 2013), Communist sport success motivated non-Communist governments to develop 
elite sport (Green & Oakley, (2001). The Australian government was earliest in adopting 
strategies, and has most closely followed and implemented state-managed sport policies (Green 
& Oakley, 2001; Houlihan, 2002). Specific to WAG, the formation of the Australian Institute 
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of Sport (AIS) in 1981 resulted in the hiring of Chinese coach Ju Ping Tian3 in 1983, who 
developed a national elite WAG performance progression program. While not overly 
distinctive, the program’s demand for precision reflected Chinese and Russian approaches to 
gymnastics. With the implementation of this program, the then Australian Gymnastics 
Federation began to invest in networking and coach education, bringing British expert coaches 
to Australia for workshops and sending Australian coaches to the USSR to learn (Kerr & 
Cervin, 2016).  
In Brazil and Italy, the Communist influence had few effects. WAG followed a de-
centralised structure and no national sport policies were implemented. A first development 
towards Communist WAG occurred in Italy in 1984 through the founding of one elite training 
centre - Brixia Brescia. In The Netherlands, despite a de-centralised organisation of sport 
(Waardenburg & Bottenburg, 2013), Communist influence was evident from the 1970s onwards 
through the Dutch Sports Federation’s creation of the national sport centre ‘Papendal’ in 1971; 
elite gymnasts being obliged to train there and live with billet families from 1976 onwards 
(Waardenburg & van Bottenburg, 2013); and the reception of coaches from Hungary, Romania, 
and USSR from 1972 onwards. 
WAG since 1989 
Since the fall of Communism in 1989, the six case countries’ national WAG’s systems have 
changed significantly. While the global acceptance of a state-governed and –financed system 
and the pixie-style model continued to influence countries’ efforts to systematise this sport, a 
number of specific local events and conditions heterogenised the six countries’ WAG 
developments. In Australia, two key local events and conditions compromised the state-
governed and –funded system established during the 1990s. First, as the Communist coaches 
hired by state sport institutes began to develop successful gymnasts (Kerr & Obel, 2018), the 
state and club coaches did not want to lose their ‘investments’ to the centralised AIS because 
this would have changed the gymnasts’ affiliations and cut the state institute funding attached 
to these athletes. Second, in 1995, AIS gymnasts accused coaches of abuse. While the resulting 
Opie Report did not find evidence for the allegations, the accusations and inquiry damaged the 
AIS program and the then national coach Ju Ping Tian (Varney, 1999). In this context of state 
institute dissatisfaction of having to pass on their successful gymnasts and AIS criticism, 
 
3 Zheng, Tan and Bairner (2017) write that the Chinese gymnastics coaches of the 1970s were trained by Soviet 
coaches through training camps and other forms of exchange. As Ju Ping Tian was national women’s coach from 
1981 to 1983, she undoubtedly was influenced by Soviet gymnastics experts. 
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support for a de-centralised national program grew and became implemented in the later 1990s, 
a change, which produced the best ever WAG results between 2003 and 2010. Since 2010, 
success has stalled, however, and Gymnastics Australia is today hoping that the recruitment of 
Romanian-American Mihai Brestyan, and the performance progression program that he has 
implemented, will revitalise WAG. 
For Romanian and now Russian WAG, the key local condition that troubled these two 
countries post-1989 was ceased state-governance and -funding (Riordan, 1995). As an 
immediate consequence, coaches and gymnasts lost their livelihoods and were forced to, or 
took the opportunity, to emigrate (Riordan, 1995). The lack of funding also closed training 
centres and (boarding) schools, and ended coach education, research, and talent identification 
procedures, and financial assistance for athletes. In Romania, although performance success 
continued for some years, and the two key coaches Octavian Bellu and Mariana Bitang kept the 
country’s WAG invincibility mirage alive through continued national and international media 
attention, the sport’s downfall moved the media discourse from supremacy to disappointment 
and indignation. This country’s failure to qualify for the 2016 Olympic Games (OG), coupled 
with former gymnast Maria Olaru’s (2016) book ‘The Price of Gold’, which described the 
physical and emotional violence practiced by Octavian Bellu and Mariana Bitang, climaxed the 
changed local representation of gymnasts.  
In Russia, it was not until President Putin’s 2006 directive to rebuild elite sport that 
some infrastructure was restored, influential coaches kept and even brought home, and the 
existing, although reduced, gymnast population cultivated more systematically. The directive 
also secured a sponsorship deal between the Russian Gymnastics Federation and the country’s 
largest partly state-owned consumer bank VTB. Putin’s 2006 government directive and the 
sponsorship deal with VTB Bank have contributed to revitalising this country’s WAG system, 
however, as the sponsorship is top-heavy, and local government support remains insecure, 
existing funding is insufficient to filter down to cover the needs at grass roots level WAG.  
More long-term, a domestic condition that continues to concern Romanian and Russian 
WAG is the free market economy that these countries have adopted since 1989. As Girginov 
and Sandanski (2008) and Petracovschi and Terret (2013) have demonstrated through their 
Romanian and Bulgarian case studies, adopting consumer and marketing thinking after a long 
history of state governance is difficult. Moreover, sport participation now relies on consumer 
choice, rather than Communist ideologies of state service and rewards, a condition that 
increasing costs of participation and the sport’s loss of popularity complicate. Today, in 
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addition to a lack of state-management and -funding, Romanian WAG suffers an image crisis, 
has a reduced elite gymnast population, and is led by very few and mostly aged coaches. Efforts 
to re-invent the elite sport and WAG systems will continue to challenge this country’s sport 
organisations (Petracovschi & Terret, 2013). Similarly, Russian WAG popularity and 
population is today much lower than prior to 1989, and this country continues to risk decline if 
stakeholders cannot develop additional strategies to maintain and improve its WAG operations. 
In contrast to the former Communist countries’ decline of WAG, Brazil, Italy and The 
Netherlands have since 1989 increasingly developed their WAG systems. In many ways, these 
efforts reflect the global sporting flow from East to West that has shaped elite sport systems 
around the globe (Green & Collins, 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green & Oakley, 2001). 
In Brazil, the development of WAG began through the hiring of Soviet-trained coaches, before 
and particularly since the establishment of the ‘Curitiba Training Centre’ in 2000, and the 
Brazilian Olympic Committee and Ministry of Sport’s intense elite sport investment leading up 
to the 2016 OG, which included the athlete funding scheme Brazil Medal Plan. These 
Communist-informed measures have brought competitive success since 2001. Two domestic 
events and conditions have complicated Brazilian WAG activities. First, in 2008, gymnasts 
alleged to have experienced abuse by stakeholders of the Brazilian Gymnastics Confederation 
and Curitiba Training Centre coaches, which resulted in a change in presidency and Technical 
Committee, and led to the closure of the national training facility Curitiba and dispersion of 
gymnasts back to their clubs (Molinari, Costa, Monteiro, & Nunomura, 2018). Second, the 
Brazilian Gymnastics Confederation has since 1989 missed to implement gymnast and coach 
development strategies. At the 2016 OG, the elite gymnast population was small and relied on 
gymnasts that have been in WAG since 2001 and the lack of employment opportunities 
provided to Brazilian coaches has resulted in coach emigration (Nunomura & Oliveira, 2012). 
While the lack of gymnast development is today changing (only one gymnast is from the 2001 
generation), the consequence of the coach emigration continues to mean that Brazilian WAG 
relies on the costly employment of foreign coaches. The Brazilian Olympic Committee’s latest 
recruitment of Russian-American Valeri Liukin, who has coached several Olympic champions, 
continues this trend of hoping that first generation Soviet-trained coaches produce WAG 
performance.  
In The Netherlands, the 1970s efforts to systematise WAG were initially stalled by 
financial problems and missing competitive success. With the closure of Papendal in 1992, the 
distribution of gymnasts back to their home clubs and gymnast retirement created modest 
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success during the 1990s. Through the creative work of a number of coaches employed by 
individual clubs, WAG regained momentum, producing a ‘golden generation’ of gymnasts from 
2002 to 2005. In response, the Royal Dutch Gymnastics Federation (KNGU) restructured WAG 
in 2008. With regional, national, and talent development centres in place, competitive results 
flourished and KNGU used the opportunity to initiate the 2012 OG campaign 
#OrangeElegance. Allegations of abuse, through Simone Heitinga and Stasja Kohler’s 
biography and media reports, overshadowed these developments. Several coaches implicated 
in the allegations were fired and serious and heated discussions about elite WAG and child-
friendly elite gymnastics training followed. Today, Dutch WAG success continues, with KNGU 
running a further social media campaign, the 2020 OG #TheForceIsGrace campaign.  
In Italy, the development of WAG was more heterogeneous than in Brazil and The 
Netherlands. In the first 10 years following 1989, the country’s national governing body, the 
Italian Gymnastics Federation (FGI), was autonomous from the state and self-supported. The 
project Brixia Integral Development, which the gymnastics club Brixia Brescia initiated and 
funded in 1990, was a grassroots project to develop elite WAG led by Enrico Casella. This 
project was crucial in advancing Brixia Brescia to a permanent, although modest, WAG training 
facility and develop elite-level success. With this success, particularly Vanessa Ferraris’ World 
Championship title in 2006, and Italy’s transformation to a state-dependent sport support 
system from 2000 onwards, the FGI began to co-finance the training facility. This included the 
employment of Enrico Casella as the national head coach in 2004, who implemented a scientific 
approach and athlete-centred pedagogy to train elite gymnasts. Moreover, the FGI’s 
Gymnastics for All and Olympic Gymnastics campaigns to increase the Italian WAG 
population (starting in 2000), as well as the MTV reality television show that was broadcasted 
for five seasons (starting in 2011), and their own online TV channel (starting in 2017) to 
generate sponsorship deals, have made WAG more visible. Today, despite limited funds, Italy’s 
WAG success continues and Brexia Brescia is recognised as an International Academy, where 
federations and clubs from all over the world meet to develop skill and knowledge (Brixia 
International Academy F.G.I., 2018). 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to examine the development of WAG systems in Australia, Brazil, Italy, 
Romania, Russia, and The Netherlands since 1989 using glocalisation theory. Our results 
demonstrate that the Communist WAG system influenced the four sampled non-Communist 
countries to adopt measures to develop this sport. In Australia, Brazil, and The Netherlands, the 
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adopted development strategies most closely reflected Romanian and Russian WAG regime 
characteristics. This homogenisation process entailed what a number of scholars have named a 
global WAG flow from East to West (Green & Collins, 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green 
& Oakley, 2001). Italy’s efforts to develop WAG stand out for being less driven by Communist 
thinking. By adopting strategies specific to this country’s financial context, building local 
coaching expertise, and investing in popularising WAG, this country has developed a WAG 
system that produces competitive success, has a sustainable WAG athlete and coach population, 
has acquired funds for their elite operations, and has developed an internationally recognised 
training facility.  
Our results demonstrate how local events and conditions have heterogenised WAG 
systems and continue to pose specific domestic challenges. The acquisition of funds and cases 
of abuse stand out as common such challenges. In terms of funding, our chapter outlined 
different funding systems and the domestic challenges these pose because of insufficiency, 
purpose, and funder-receiver relationships. A response to the challenge of insufficient funding, 
as adopted by Italy and The Netherlands, was to implement innovative popularising strategies. 
In the former Communist countries, where stakeholders have not yet accustomed to a free 
market economy, marketing and sponsorship funding is either limited or non-existent, and will 
continue to need innovation. In terms of abuse, cases that generated inquiries and significant 
media attention were reported in Australia, Brazil, Romania, and The Netherlands. In these 
countries, the abuse cases affected local affairs, and similar to financial challenges, will 
continue to require organisations to develop preventative measures. It is a situation that 
demonstrates how uncritical reflection of dominant practices (i.e., pixie style model of WAG) 
can have undesired consequences (Collins & Bailey, 2013). While some WAG organisations 
have started to distance themselves from the Communist WAG system, and its pixie-style 
model in particular (e.g., Sweden), more critical reflection of these understandings, and 
development of local strategies to safeguard gymnasts, are necessary to re-invent WAG. 
In conclusion, our results have shown how the fall of Communism in 1989 has de-
centred Romanian and Russian WAG and how the strategies adopted by the included non-
Communist countries diversified the international WAG landscape. Regardless of decline or 
gain, however, our chapter has demonstrated that the developments within each of the six 
countries’ WAG systems evolved in interaction with global and local events and conditions. 
Thus, while sport policy research outlines factors that create successful sport systems, it is 
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crucial that sport organisations acknowledge local events and conditions, and are prepared for 
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